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A B S T R A C T
This article analyses party–voter congruence on European
integration matters in the EU member states. Drawing on
existing research, we put forward eight hypotheses which
are tested with data from the EES2004 survey. We show that
parties are closer to their voters on the left/right dimension
than on the EU dimension. Parties are also more supportive
of European integration than are their voters. Party system
characteristics (number of parties, ideological range) did not
affect opinion congruence. The responsiveness analysis at
the party level shows that government parties were less
responsive than opposition parties; party size was related to
responsiveness, with opinion congruence higher in smaller
parties; and responsiveness was lower among centrist
parties. Voters are also better represented on the EU dimen-
sion by their parties in the new than in the older EU member
states. This difference may result from the EU occupying a
more central place on the political agendas of the new
member states.
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Introduction
Representation is both a complex and a contested phenomenon. It is complex
in the sense that it can be approached from a variety of angles, with most of
the empirical research focusing on the linkages between the representatives
(such as members of parliament and political parties) and those who elect
them. It is contested in the sense that there is no commonly accepted norma-
tive rule or objective criterion for assessing whether representation works or
not.
Nonetheless, students of representative democracy do agree on certain
basic conditions that a political system should meet. First, the composition of
the representative body (primarily the legislature) should reflect the compo-
sition of the electorate, thus ensuring that all main societal groups are repre-
sented in public policy-making. Secondly, there should be at least some
congruence of preferences between the citizens and their representatives.
Although there is no consensus on what constitutes a sufficiently high level
of such opinion agreement, it is easy to agree with Wessels (1999: 137), who
states that ‘the smallest common denominator in normative terms, though, is
that in a democracy there should be some match between the interests of the
people and what representatives promote’.
Considering the dominance of the left/right cleavage in European politics
(Huber and Inglehart, 1995), it is not surprising that most studies find politi-
cal parties to be quite representative of their voters on this dimension.
However, any new dimension or issue that enters the political agenda,
particularly if that issue is only weakly related to the left/right dimension, is
bound to cause problems for parties. The main such new dimension in
European politics is undoubtedly the development of the European Union
(EU). Indeed, several scholars have argued that the European party-political
space, at least in those countries that joined the Union before 2004, is
nowadays based on two main dimensions – the old left/right cleavage and
the new EU cleavage, often defined as an anti/pro-European integration
dimension (e.g. Hix, 1999; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Marks and Wilson, 1999;
Marks and Steenbergen, 2002b, 2004; Mattila, 2004). One of the key arguments
of this research is that the low connectedness between these two dimensions
creates problems for the established political parties, which hence have an
incentive to downplay European issues and to structure competition along
the more familiar and thus safer socioeconomic cleavage.
Comparing voters’ own policy positions with their assessment of the
position of the party they voted for, this article analyses the congruence of
preferences between political parties and their voters on European integra-
tion in 22 EU member countries. More specifically, we are not just interested
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in reporting levels of issue agreement; the main aim is to find explanations
for the variation between the individual countries and parties. The article is
structured as follows. The next section presents the findings of existing
research on policy representation and on the impact of the EU on the party
systems of its member states. Drawing on these two strands of research, we
introduce the research hypotheses and data, followed by the empirical
analysis. The concluding discussion summarizes our findings.
Policy representation and European integration
Representative democracy is based on the concepts of delegation and account-
ability. The main act of delegation is that of the voters casting their vote in
an election, with the elected representatives then held accountable for their
actions in the next election. When choosing their party and/or candidate in
the election, voters presumably have at least some knowledge of the prefer-
ences of the parties competing in the election. Indeed, according to the so-
called party government or ‘responsible party model’, which has driven much
of the policy representation research in the European context (Powell, 2004:
284), cohesive parties should offer competing choices to the voters, who then
vote for the party that is closest to their preferences. Once in office, parties
will carry out the promises made in the campaign, and hence eventual
government policy will be in line with the preferences of the majority of the
electorate (Thomassen, 1994). Whether these conditions are met is obviously
an empirical matter.
Policy representation is a crucial aspect of the act of delegation in the
responsible party model. Not only should parties offer competing policy
bundles to the voters, but voters should be aware of these differences and
then choose their party accordingly. Because European party systems are
based on the left/right dimension, it is likely that citizens’ most accurate
knowledge is about the parties’ positions on that dimension, and that, the
further one moves from traditional socioeconomic questions, the less
informed voters are about party positions and the less representative parties
are of their supporters (Thomassen, 1994). According to Kitschelt (2000: 851),
political parties stick to the established patterns of competition and reduce
the dimensionality of the political discourse for at least two reasons:
First, in representative democracy, . . . representatives are charged with represent-
ing their constituencies over an infinite and uncertain range of issues. Thus, to
enable voters to anticipate candidate positions on issues in which voters do not
know the parties’ positions or in which parties do not (yet) have positions, parties
. . . signal to voters more fundamental principles for generating policy stances that
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would apply to new and ex ante unforeseeable political issue conflicts. Second,
voters are information misers and typically lack time and resources to review the
candidates’ and parties’ specific issue positions. Instead, they are looking for
simple underlying principles according to which parties generate issue stances.
Thus the dominance of the left/right dimension, the familiarity of that dimen-
sion among voters, and parties’ own strategic interests all contribute to atten-
tion in European politics focusing on socioeconomic matters. Hence it is not
surprising that research on policy representation has found European politi-
cal parties to be fairly representative of their voters on the left/right dimen-
sion. Both comparative analyses and country studies testify that, by and large,
European citizens are well represented on that key dimension of party compe-
tition (e.g. Dalton, 1985; Klingemann, 1995; Widfeldt, 1995; Thomassen and
Schmitt, 1997, 1999a; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Pierce, 1999; Holmberg, 2000).1
It is easy to concur with Kitschelt (2000: 845) who argues that ‘it is a key
task for political scientists to identify the conditions under which politicians
are responsive to citizens’ preferences’. However, there appears to be no
consensus on which factors work for and against effective policy representa-
tion in left/right matters. The only broader study that focuses exclusively on
comparing policy representation in different countries is Miller et al. (1999),
which employs largely comparable elite and citizen data from France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. Interestingly, the
authors of that book reach quite divergent conclusions. Wessels (1999) did
find a link between party system features and policy representation, with the
median voter better represented in countries with majoritarian electoral
systems, and party voters better represented in countries with proportional
representation (PR) election systems. Wessels (1999: 153) also concluded that
‘the stronger the polarization – the more differentiated the supply – the better
the match between party voters and MPs of that party’.
However, Holmberg (1999: 94) reached a different conclusion:
Given the differences in measurement techniques and measurement scales and
the very limited number of issues included in some studies, the conservative
conclusion is that the degree of collective policy congruence between elected
leaders and voters did not differ in any substantial way between the five politi-
cal systems . . . [T]he political system does not matter when it comes to degrees
of policy congruence between leaders and voters in Western democracies.
Pierce (1999: 31) also found no connection between the fragmentation of the
party system and the effectiveness of policy representation.
With data from Eurobarometers and from a survey of MEP candidates
carried out in 1979, Dalton (1985) compared policy congruence in the then
nine European Community countries. At the system level, Dalton found that
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PR electoral systems and higher party diversity (operationalized as the
number of parties in parliament and the fractionalization of the legislature)
produced better issue agreement: ‘As the number and variety of parties
increases, it becomes easier for voters to locate a party that simultaneously
represents their views on all issue dimensions’ (Dalton, 1985: 287). At the
party level, Dalton showed that parties on the right and, particularly, on the
left (as opposed to being centrist) had better opinion congruence, and that
having a centralized party organization also facilitated issue agreement.
Comparing issue congruence on the left/right dimension between the median
voter and the government in 12 industrialized countries, Huber and Powell
(1994) showed that congruence increased when the effective number of
parties and the proportionality of election outcomes also increased.
However, the reality is altogether different when we examine attitudes
towards European integration, which arguably has become the second main
cleavage in European politics. Recently an increasing number of studies has
focused on the role of parties in the EU system. Perhaps the most significant
finding of this research is the divisive nature of the European question.
Regardless of the data used – voting behaviour in legislatures, surveys of
citizens and MPs, expert surveys, or more descriptive approaches – European
integration is clearly a destabilizing factor for national parties.
Although European questions have led to severe conflicts among and
within parties in several EU countries, European integration has nonetheless
not altered the basic structure of national party systems by resulting in the
formation of new parties (Mair, 2000). This is not surprising. Indeed, there
are very strong reasons to expect that we would not witness the entry of new
parties as a result of European integration. The main explanatory factor for
the observed stability is that the established national parties have an interest
in sustaining the status quo and the prevailing structures of party competi-
tion. After all, despite the gradual partisan de-alignment, parties still have
their ‘natural’ pools of voters and they have reputations for particular
programmes and policy objectives. Giving the EU dimension a stronger role
in the competition for votes would potentially lead to instability that might
weaken the role of the main national parties (Marks and Steenbergen, 2002a:
881–2). As Hooghe et al. (2002: 970) argue:
Parties that are successful in the existing structure of contestation have little incen-
tive to rock the boat, while unsuccessful parties, that is, parties with weak elec-
toral support or those that are locked out of government, have an interest in
restructuring competition. The same strategic logic that leads mainstream parties
to assimilate the issues raised by European integration into the Left/Right dimen-
sion of party competition leads peripheral parties to exploit European integration
in an effort to shake up the party system.
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Viewed from the perspective of the responsible party model, mainstream
parties are thus offering competing choices to voters in left/right matters but
not in European questions.
Whereas studies have shown parties to be fairly representative of their
voters on the left/right dimension, the picture is much bleaker in European
matters. First, parties are ideologically less cohesive on integration than on
traditional left/right issues (e.g. Hix, 1999; Ray, 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt,
1999b). Moreover, within parties the elected representatives are considerably
more supportive of integration than are their voters, with the European
dimension revealing a wide gap between citizens and MPs. The first compara-
tive study on issue agreement on integration matters did, however, find
considerable congruence of opinion. Comparing voters’ perceptions of where
parties stand and voters’ own preferences from a survey carried out right
after the 1989 EP elections, Van der Eijk and Franklin (1991: 124) showed that
most parties were representative of their voters on integration matters, with
‘only a few parties’ taking positions that were clearly out of line with the
position of their voters.
Comparing the preferences of citizens and candidates in the 1994 EP elec-
tions on concrete policy issues concerning the EU (abolition of borders, unem-
ployment, single currency), Thomassen and Schmitt (1997: 181) concluded
that the elite and the electorate were ‘living in different European worlds’.
And, when comparing the views of MPs, MEPs and citizens on those issues,
the authors stated a couple of years later that, ‘across the board, voters’ atti-
tudes appeared to be less pro-European than those of the political elites,
whether they were members of the European Parliament or of the national
parliaments’ (Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999a: 206). Using the same data,
Marsh and Wessels (1997) showed that MEPs from countries with highly
proportional electoral systems were more likely to represent citizens better
than were MEPs from countries with less proportional systems.
In another article, based on elite and citizen survey data from 1979 and
1994, Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) showed that, although the policy pref-
erences of the voters and the parties did diverge, issue agreement between
voters and party elites about the general development of integration (‘are you
for or against efforts being made to unify Europe?’) was as high as on the
left/right dimension. Thus they argued that, whereas policy representation
may be failing on specific EU policy issues, it does seem to work fairly well
as far as the overall development of integration is concerned. Finally, using
data from the 1999 European Election Study (EES), in which voters were asked
to place both themselves and the parties on the anti/pro-integration dimen-
sion, Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) showed that the diversity of opinion
among the electorate was not reflected at the level of the parties. There was
European Union Politics 7(4)4 3 2
thus, according to those authors, ‘potential for contestation’ on EU matters,
with the EU issue being a ‘sleeping giant’ in European politics. The study also
showed the parties to be far more supportive of integration than were the
voters.
Most of these previous studies on policy representation in EU matters
have basically just reported the preferences or positions of voters and parties.
Only a few of them have gone beyond descriptive analysis. Our study consti-
tutes an attempt at explaining variation in levels of issue agreement both
between countries and between individual political parties. Moreover, the
existing body of research on policy representation has produced somewhat
contradictory findings, with no consensus on what explains variation between
individual countries or parties. Drawing partly on that previous research, we
shall introduce our research hypotheses in the next section.
Research hypotheses
The primary goal of this article is to explain variation in party–voter congru-
ence on European integration in the EU member states. Our analysis proceeds
in three stages. First, we compare opinion congruence on the EU dimension
with congruence levels on the left/right dimension. Next, we examine repre-
sentativeness at the system level by comparing the responsiveness of party
systems in the different EU countries. Then, we shall change our focus to the
party level, and explain variation between individual parties.
In line with this approach, our research hypotheses are also broken down
into three categories. First we put forward two hypotheses relating to politi-
cal dimensions. Because previous research indicates that elites are more
supportive of integration than are citizens, we expect to find that in 2004 too the
parties were more pro-integrationist than were their voters (Hypothesis 1). We also
expect, again in line with the findings of previous research, opinion congru-
ence to be higher on the left/right dimension than on the anti/pro-integration dimen-
sion (H2).
Moving next to explaining variation between individual countries (the
system level), we test the impact of three factors. Party system characteristics
have been argued by several authors to affect the effectiveness of policy repre-
sentation. Although previous studies have produced mixed findings, they
seem to lean towards arguing that greater party system fragmentation
improves the congruence of opinion between the masses and the elites (e.g.
Wessels, 1999). Hence we also hypothesize that the more fragmented the party
system, the greater the congruence of opinions between voters and parties (H3). The
idea is simply that a larger number of competing parties means voters have
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more options to find their ‘own’ party in the elections. Of course, it is quite
possible that parties decide to compete in the election on policy dimensions
other than the EU dimension, but this is a question for empirical analysis.
Our second system-level variable is ideological range, sometimes also
called wing party distance (Gilljam and Oscarsson, 1996), operationalized as
the distance on both the left/right and the EU dimensions between the most
left-wing and the most right-wing or the most anti-EU and the most pro-EU
party in the country. According to this hypothesis, greater ideological range will
produce better representativeness (H4), as parties offer more policy options to
voters.
Our final system-level hypothesis is not derived from previous research
on policy representation, and focuses more specifically on European integra-
tion. We expect that the timing of membership matters, with lower congruence on
EU matters in the new member states that joined the Union in the spring of 2004
(H5), just under two months before the survey, from which our data are taken,
was carried out. The reason for this expectation is that, in these newly democ-
ratized member countries, European questions are new to the parties and to
the voters, and therefore parties have had less time to adopt positions on inte-
gration and there has been less time for parties and their supporters to ‘find
each other’ in EU matters. Another factor that speaks on behalf of this hypoth-
esis is that stable party systems should produce higher opinion congruence
(Holmberg, 1999), with the newly democratized post-communist countries
still characterized by much higher party system instability than the older EU
member states. However, a valid counter-argument is that, because the June
2004 EP elections took place so soon after EU membership referenda, the
higher salience of European integration on the political agendas of these
countries may have produced better congruence between parties and their
voters.
Turning to the explanation of variation between individual parties, we
put forward three hypotheses. We expect government status to make a differ-
ence, with the level of congruence depending on whether or not a party is in
the government. We argue that government membership makes parties less repre-
sentative of their voters (H6), the logic being that participation in government,
particularly the bargaining involved in multi-party coalitions, distances
parties from their voters. Additionally, government parties represent their
country at the EU level in the Council and the European Council, and this
may present them with further restrictions.
Our second party-level variable is party size. We expect representativeness
to be higher in small parties than in large parties (H7). The rationale is simple:
small parties are likely to be ideologically more homogeneous than are larger
parties, which necessarily have bigger and thus more heterogeneous
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electorates, hence ending up with lower party–voter congruence than small
niche parties have.
The final party-level variable tests the impact of party ideology. This
variable is derived from Dalton (1985), according to whom ideological
centrism had a negative effect on policy representation. Hence we also expect
that ideological centrism produces lower congruence, with parties that are
further from the political centre on the left/right dimension being more representa-
tive of their voters (H8). The rationale behind this hypothesis is that parties
that are situated on the left or the right have clearer policy profiles than have
centrist parties, with this ideological clarity facilitating higher responsiveness.
Data
Our data are taken from the European Election Study 2004 (EES2004) project,
which consisted (for the most part) of identical surveys carried out in the EU
countries just after the European Parliament elections held in June. Unfortu-
nately, not all countries were included in the survey, and hence our data set
covers only 22 political systems.2 Of these political systems, 21 are EU member
states; additionally we have data from Northern Ireland, in which a separate
survey was conducted because Northern Ireland has its own unique party
system different from the rest of the United Kingdom. Although Northern
Ireland is not an EU member state, for the sake of simplicity we will refer to
our 22 political systems as member states or as member countries in the text.
We use questionnaire data for locating both the parties and their voters
on the anti/pro-integration dimension and on the left/right dimension.
Hence our approach differs from the majority of previous studies on policy
representation that have compared voter data with elite-level data (mainly
surveys of MPs or MEPs). Of the studies dealing with policy representation
in EU matters, only Van der Eijk and Franklin (1991) relied exclusively on
voter data as we do here.
We compare voters’ own policy positions with their assessment of the
position of the party they voted for. Basically, we assume that when the
distance between voters and their party is small, parties do a good job of
representing their voters and vice versa. For each party we calculated two
measures. First, using only the respondents who indicated that they voted for
a particular party in the 2004 EP elections, we calculated their average posi-
tions on the EU and left/right dimensions. Second, we calculated from the
same respondents where they perceived their ‘own’ party to stand on these
dimensions. Comparing the resulting two average values, it is possible to
analyse how close or far voters feel that their parties are to themselves. In
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order to avoid a situation where our results are dominated by a large number
of small parties that even collectively obtain just a fraction of the vote, we
weigh the observations by the parties’ share of the votes in the 2004 EP elec-
tions in the empirical analysis.
We acknowledge that voter perceptions of party locations may not be
accurate reflections of reality, with the majority of European citizens probably
having quite limited information or knowledge of party policies, at least
concerning European integration. More specifically, voters may be engaging in
wishful thinking, projecting their own preferences onto their preferred parties.
If this is indeed the case, then our data systematically underestimate the
distances between parties and their voters. However, it is important to empha-
size that, although voters may not be able to place parties accurately on politi-
cal dimensions, they are likely to base their vote choices on their own
perceptions of party and/or candidate positions. Other approaches to inferring
parties’ positions, such as expert surveys and content analysis of party
programmes (Mair, 2001) or using elite data, do not allow us directly to compare
the positions of voters and their perceptions of where the parties stand.
The main interest in this article is the distance between voters and their
parties on the EU dimension, which was operationalized in the EES2004 ques-
tionnaire as a 1–10 scale measuring respondents’ attitudes towards European
unification. The exact wording of the question was: ‘Some say European unifi-
cation should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What
is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point scale. On this
scale, 1 means unification “has already gone too far” and 10 means it “should
be pushed further”. What number on this scale best describes your position?’
This question was followed by several questions where the respondents were
asked to indicate, using the same scale, where the main parties of their respec-
tive countries were located. In the following, we refer to this dimension as
the anti/pro-EU dimension or simply as the EU dimension.
In addition, and in order to put our results into perspective, we compare
policy representation on the EU dimension with representativeness on the
conventional left/right dimension. Measures from this dimension are based
on the following question: ‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and
“the right”. What is your position? Please indicate your views using any
number on a 10-point scale. On this scale, where 1 means “left” and 10 means
“right”, which number best describes your position?’ As with the EU
question, this question was followed by a set of questions in which respon-
dents were asked to indicate the positions of the main parties in their country
on the left/right scale according to their perception.
Our data set comprises 122 parties from 22 political systems (79 from the
old and 43 from the new member states). In the case of some smaller parties,
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only a handful of respondents voted for them. In this study, only parties with
10 or more voters among the respondents are included to avoid calculating
policy position averages from a very small group of voters. This restriction
means that some small parties are dropped from the analysis. Furthermore,
a much more severe restriction on the inclusion of some parties is caused by
the system of joint lists in several member states. In some countries, the
respondents voted for lists that included two or more parties, and hence the
data do not reveal which particular party they supported. These parties also
had to be dropped from the analysis. For example, in Portugal the joint list
of two parties, the Social Democrats (PSD) and the People’s Party (PP), gained
35% of the votes in the 2004 EP elections. However, from the questionnaire
data we know only that some respondents voted for the PSD–PP list but not
which of the two parties they supported. Hence, these two parties cannot be
included in the data set and as a result we were able to include only three
parties from Portugal in our study. Fortunately, for most of the countries we
were able to include all or, at least, most of the major parties (see the appendix
for more information).3 Put together, the parties included in our analysis won
on average over 84% of the votes in the 2004 European elections. In many
countries, such as Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany and Greece, they won
over 90% of the votes.
There are several ways of measuring the representativeness of individ-
ual politicians or political parties (see Achen, 1978). We begin our analysis
with two very simple measures. First, we analyse the distance between the
average position of party voters and the position of their party on the EU and
left/right dimensions. This distance measure does not tell us anything about
the direction of possible differences between parties and their voters – for
example, whether parties have adopted more favourable positions towards
European integration than have their voters. The second measure, called
‘bias’, is simply the difference between the party position and the voter
position. Positive values of this measure indicate that parties have more pro-
integration stances than their voters on the EU dimension or that they have
more rightist views on the left/right dimension, whereas negative values
indicate the opposite.
Analysis of political dimensions
Distance and bias averages for the 22 political systems are presented in
Table 1. The second and third columns of the table show how close or far an
average party is located from its voters on the EU and left/right dimensions.
On the EU dimension, parties in Northern Ireland are closest to their voters.
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The average distance between a party and its voters in Northern Ireland is
only 0.1 on the 10-point EU scale, which means that parties are indeed very
close to their voters. On the left/right dimension, too, Northern Irish parties
seem to be close to their voters. This is quite surprising because the traditional
left/right dimension and the EU dimension are hardly defining political
cleavages in Northern Irish politics.
Other countries where parties are located very close to their voters on the
EU dimension are Cyprus and the Czech Republic. On the EU dimension, the
biggest gap between parties and voters can be found in Great Britain, where
the average distance is more than 10 times bigger than in Northern Ireland.
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Table 1 Opinion congruence between parties and their voters, 2004.
Distance Bias
—————————— ———————–————
EU Left/right EU Left/right 
Country dimension dimension dimension dimension
Northern Ireland 0.10 0.21 0.05 0.19
Cyprus 0.32 0.43 0.20 –0.07
Czech Republic 0.46 0.67 –0.13 0.04
France 0.59 0.33 0.59 0.30
Netherlands 0.59 0.22 0.48 0.02
Slovakia 0.61 0.66 0.42 0.60
Spain 0.62 0.29 0.58 0.28
Ireland 0.73 0.43 0.70 0.26
Italy 0.81 0.42 0.64 0.29
Germany 0.81 0.48 0.54 0.17
Slovenia 0.86 0.60 0.86 0.60
Denmark 0.91 0.40 0.44 0.18
Estonia 0.96 0.43 0.73 0.12
Latvia 0.97 0.54 0.97 0.34
Greece 0.99 0.34 0.44 0.19
Poland 1.03 0.73 –0.13 0.41
Portugal 1.04 0.81 0.64 0.51
Austria 1.20 0.51 1.20 0.18
Finland 1.39 0.43 1.39 0.21
Luxembourg 1.42 0.76 1.43 0.71
Hungary 1.51 0.31 1.52 0.23
Great Britain 1.60 0.51 1.60 0.51
All countries (N = 122) 0.90 0.47 0.70 0.28
Old member states (N = 79) 0.92 0.43 0.77 0.28
New member states (N = 43) 0.86 0.54 0.56 0.27
One would be tempted to say that this is related to the British majoritarian
political system, but this is clearly not the case because distances are also large
in some countries with proportional electoral systems, such as Finland and
Austria.
When looking at the average distance measures in the bottom panel of
Table 1, one can see that parties are closer to their voters on the left/right
dimension than they are on the EU dimension, which supports our second
hypothesis. Similar conclusions can be reached when one compares the
distances in the old and in the new EU member states. Basically, parties in
the new member states are as close to their voters as are parties in the old
member states on both dimensions. The small differences in the actual figures
are not statistically significant. Thus, our hypothesis (H5) expecting better
representation in the old than in the new member states on the EU dimen-
sion is not supported in this initial analysis.
Turning to the bias measures, shown in the last two columns of Table 1,
it can be seen that parties are indeed more favourable to European integra-
tion than are their voters, as our first hypothesis expected. On the EU dimen-
sion, positive figures mean that parties have adopted more pro-EU positions
than their voters. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland are voters on
average more favourable to European integration than are the parties they
voted for. However, the figures for these two countries are very small, indi-
cating that the anti-Europe bias among parties is practically non-existent. The
biggest differences between parties and their voters are found in Great Britain,
Hungary, Luxembourg and Finland.
The pro-European integration bias among parties can be seen both in the
new and in the old member states. However, the average bias seems to be
bigger in the old member states (0.77) than in the new (0.56), but the differ-
ence is not statistically significant. The bias on the left/right dimension is
considerably less than the bias on the EU dimension, indicating, again, that
parties represent their voters better on the left/right dimension than on the
EU dimension.
System-level analysis
In Table 2 the relationship between political system characteristics and repre-
sentativeness on both the EU and left/right dimensions is analysed with
regression analysis. The distance and bias figures are from Table 1. Accord-
ing to our hypotheses (H3–H5), the number of parties, the ideological range
they represent and whether the country is a new/old member state would
have an impact on representativeness. The number of parties is measured
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with the Laakso–Taagepera (1979) index of effective parties (calculated from
the distribution of seats in national parliaments at the time of the elections).
The ideological range, i.e. the distance between the extreme parties, is
measured both on the EU and on the left/right dimensions using the EES2004
data set.
The results in Table 2 are rather disappointing. Most of the regression
coefficients are small, with only one being statistically significant and even
its sign is contrary to what we hypothesized. We expected greater ideologi-
cal range to make parties more representative of their voters on the EU dimen-
sion, but the positive coefficient seems to indicate that, in party systems with
large wing party distance, parties are further away from their voters than they
are in countries with less ideological breadth. All in all, none of our three
political system-level hypotheses gained support in the empirical analysis.
Party-level analysis
Next we turn to analysing voter–party opinion congruence at party level
using Achen’s (1978) regression-based approach, which he calls the respon-
siveness measure of representation. This approach has already been used, e.g.
by Dalton (1985), Herrera et al. (1992), Wessels (1999) and Kitschelt et al.
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Table 2 Regression analyses of opinion congruence and political system
characteristics
Distance Bias
—————————— ———————–————
EU Left/right EU Left/right 
dimension dimension dimension dimension
Constant 0.85** 0.39** 1.04** 0.35
(0.22) (0.14) (0.32) (0.22)
Number of parties –0.07 0.01 –0.04 0.02
(0.44) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04)
Ideological range 0.11* 0.02 –0.04 –0.03
(0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04)
New member state 0.00 0.10 –0.18 0.00
(0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
R2 .07 .03 .02 .01
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, N = 122.
(1999). The basic idea behind the responsiveness approach is that, the better
we are able to predict party positions on policy or issue dimensions using
party voter positions on these same dimensions, the better the responsive-
ness. This can be expressed as a regression equation as follows (see Dalton,
1985: 281):
Party position = a + b(voter position)
The degree of overall party responsiveness is determined by both the inter-
cept, a, and the regression coefficient, b, of the model.
According to this perspective of political representation, ideal responsive-
ness occurs when the intercept of the regression line is 0 and the slope
coefficient is 1. This means that, for example, if the party voter average on
the EU dimension is 7, the position of their party is also 7. If the average party
voter is located at 2, so will the party be, and so on. Different combinations
of a and b correspond to different types of deviation from ideal responsive-
ness. If both b and a equal 1, parties have a positive bias in the policy posi-
tions, meaning that they are on the average located 1 point ‘to the right’ on
the dimension. For example, if parties adopt more pro-European integration
positions than their voters, as our first hypothesis expected, we will see
positive intercepts in our regression models.
It is not only the intercept that affects the degree of responsiveness. The
regression coefficient b also has an interesting interpretation. When b is less
than 1, parties adopt more convergent positions than their voters do, that is,
the opinion differences between parties are smaller than the opinion differ-
ences between their supporters. On the other hand, if b is greater than 1, the
party system is more polarized and parties accentuate the differences between
voters. This means that, at both ends of the policy dimension, parties adopt
more extreme positions than their voters do.4
Table 3 presents the results of the responsiveness analyses (Model A) for
all parties in the data set and then separately for parties in the old and in the
new member states. Next, we included some additional variables in the
analyses (Model B) to see how they affect party responsiveness. These new
variables are related to our last three hypotheses, which concerned the effects
of government participation (H6), size of the party (H7) and ideological
centrism (H8) on representativeness. Government participation is measured
with a dummy variable, coded 1 if the party was in government at the time
of the 2004 EP elections and 0 if it was in opposition. The size of the party is
measured as the vote share it gained in the same elections. Finally, ideologi-
cal centrism (or extremism) on the left/right dimension is measured with two
dummy variables that indicate whether the party was a left-wing or a right-
wing party, where the reference category is a centrist party.5
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Examining the results of the responsiveness analysis (Model A) contain-
ing all parties in Table 3, we see that European parties deviate from the ideal
model of responsiveness in a statistically significant way. The intercept of the
model is 1.65, indicating that parties are, according to voter perceptions, more
favourable to European integration than their supporters are. Moreover, the
slope coefficient (0.83) is less than 1, showing that the variation among parties
on the EU dimension is smaller than among their voters. Basically, this
confirms the results obtained by Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) using data
from the 1999 EP elections, who concluded that European parties do not
differentiate themselves clearly enough on EU matters to offer competing
alternatives to voters.
When the new and old member states are compared, interesting results
emerge. In the case of parties from the old member countries, the pro-Europe
bias is even clearer, over 2 points on the 10-point scale. In addition, the slope
coefficient is smaller (0.75), indicating smaller variation among parties than
among their voters. However, the case is definitely different in the new
member states, where the voter–party opinion congruence corresponds
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Table 3 Regression analyses of party responsiveness on the EU dimension
Parties in old Parties in new 
All parties member states member states
————————— ————————— ——————————
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B
Constant 1.65** 1.32** 2.11** 1.93** 0.11 –0.46
(0.45) (0.37) (0.47) (0.40) (0.96) (1.00)
Voters’ EU positiona 0.83* 0.79** 0.75** 0.68** 1.07 1.03
(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.15)
Party in government – 0.50** – 0.44** – 0.67*
(0.13) (0.15) (0.28)
Party size – 2.28** – 2.20** – 3.62*
(0.50) (0.57) (1.15)
Right wing party – –0.09 – –0.03 – –0.28
(0.15) (0.18) (0.29)
Left wing party – –0.41** – –0.36* – –0.43*
(0.15) (0.17) (0.33)
Adjusted R2 .54 .66 .50 .68 .55 .67
N 122 122 79 79 43 43
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01.
a The statistical null hypothesis is that the regression coefficients equal 1.
almost exactly to the ideal responsiveness situation, a result that certainly
refutes our fifth hypothesis. Clearly parties in the new member states do a
better job of representing their voters in EU matters than do parties in the old
member states. Perhaps EU matters occupied a larger role on the political
agendas of the new member states at the time of the EES survey, with the
enlargement (and the preceding membership referenda) taking place only
shortly before the 2004 EP elections. This stronger salience of EU matters may
have forced parties to be more responsive towards their voters than was the
case in the old member states, where parties have mostly been trying to avoid
making EU matters a central component of their electoral campaigns or
discourse (see, e.g., Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004).
Model B in Table 3 shows how our additional variables are related to
responsiveness. Government parties both in the new and in the old member
countries occupy more positive positions towards European unification than
do opposition parties. This may be related to the fact that government parties
often have to make compromises that may distance them from their voters.
These compromises are made with their government partners and, perhaps
more importantly, at the EU level with other European governments and EU
institutions. Opposition parties do not face similar restrictions.
Party size too is related to responsiveness, with larger parties being, on
average, further away from their voters on the EU dimension than their
smaller counterparts. This effect can be seen both in the old and in the new
member states. Perhaps the catch-all nature of most of the larger parties, with
broad and diverse supporter bases, enables them to avoid strong dependence
on any specific group of voters (Dalton, 1985: 289).
Finally, we can see that ideological extremity on the left/right dimension
has an effect on responsiveness. In the regression analysis containing all the
parties, the left-wing dummy has a negative coefficient, showing a smaller
pro-Europe bias among these parties than among centrist and right-wing
parties. Again, the differences between the old and the new member states
are small: the coefficients are by and large similar in size to those of the new
member states. All in all, these results give at least tentative support to our
last hypothesis, which expects a smaller bias in responsiveness among parties
that have clearer ideological profiles than among catch-all centrist parties.
According to our analysis, this applies particularly to left-wing parties.
Figure 1 depicts the results in graphical form, both in the new and in the
old member states. These illustrations are based on predicted values for
various types of party using the results from Table 3. When depicting the
results for different types of party, it is assumed that independent variables
other than the one under consideration at the time take on their average
values. Furthermore, in the figures ‘large party’ denotes a party with 40%
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support whereas ‘small party’ denotes a party with 5% electoral support. The
dotted lines depict the situation where the ideal party responsiveness is
realized: parties and their supporters occupy the same location on the EU
dimension.
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Figure 1 Responsiveness of different types of parties on the EU dimension.
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From Figure 1 it is easy to see that voters in the new member states
perceive that they are rather well represented by their parties. This is especi-
ally the case with small parties, opposition parties and left-wing parties. The
situation is very different in the older member states, where a notable differ-
ence between pro-EU and anti-EU voters exists. Voters who are supportive
of the EU perceive their parties’ positions on the EU dimension to be on the
average close to their own positions. The situation is worse for voters who
have more reserved positions towards the EU. These people feel that their
parties do not reflect their EU attitudes. The stronger the voters’ anti-EU
positions are, the further away from their own parties they feel they are
located on EU matters. Thus, the problems of party responsiveness in the
old member states are manifested among the EU sceptical voters, not among
EU supporters.
Conclusions
The main objective of this article has been to analyse variation in party–voter
congruence on European integration in the EU member states. In fact, because
previous research had largely focused on merely reporting the positions of
parties and voters, this study has constituted one of the first attempts at
explaining variation in policy representation on the EU dimension between
countries and individual parties.
Drawing mainly on existing comparative research on policy representa-
tion, we put forward eight hypotheses, which were tested with data from the
EES2004 survey carried out immediately after the June 2004 EP elections. Our
findings offered only partial support for the hypotheses. In line with previous
research, we first showed that parties are closer to their voters on the left/right
dimension than on the EU dimension. Then we confirmed that parties are
more supportive of European integration than are their voters. We expected
party system characteristics (number of parties, ideological range) to have an
effect on opinion congruence, but this was clearly refuted by our analysis.
The responsiveness analysis at the party level produced several findings:
government parties were less responsive than opposition parties; party size
was related to responsiveness, with opinion congruence higher in smaller
parties; and responsiveness was lower among centrist parties. Our study also
confirms that European parties, at least in the old member states, fail to offer
enough competing alternatives to voters over European integration. This
bodes ill for the ‘responsible party model’, whose basic premise is that parties
offer competing choices to the voters, who then vote for the party that is
closest to their preferences. However, the importance of this lack of
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congruence between parties and their voters depends on the salience of EU
matters. If voters care mainly about left/right issues, and not about issues
related to European integration, then parties may be considered to be acting
‘responsibly’ even if they offer fewer choices to voters on the EU dimension
than on the left/right dimension.
Perhaps the most interesting result concerns policy representation in the
new member states. Contrary to our hypothesis, voters are actually better
represented by their parties on the EU dimension in the new member
countries than in the older EU member states. We assume that this difference
between the old and new member countries might result from the EU occu-
pying a more central place on the political agendas of these countries. After
all, the June 2004 EP elections took place just over a month after the enlarge-
ment, which had in 9 out of 10 new member states been preceded by member-
ship referenda. Hence parties had been forced to express their positions on
European integration, or at least on membership, with citizens thus exposed
to information about parties’ European policies. This stands in quite striking
contrast to the old member states, where major parties have in most countries
done their best not to have real debates over Europe’s future.
The key to improving the quality of policy representation in EU matters
would thus seem to lie in making the EU dimension more salient in national
politics. However, this appears to be a slim prospect. Strategic considerations
of national parties aside, the European Union – lacking a common identity
and the power to raise taxes or to carry out major redistributive policies –
will remain ‘distant’ from the voters for the foreseeable future. Hence opinion
congruence on the EU dimension will continue to be lower than on the
conventional left/right dimension.
Notes
We would like to thank Agnes Batory, Jacques Thomassen, Gabor Tóka and the
two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
1 For excellent reviews of empirical research on political representation, see
Thomassen (1994) and Powell (2004).
2 The EES2004 study included all the EU member states with the exception of
Malta. Unfortunately, in three countries the questionnaire did not include the
EU and left/right scale questions necessary for our analysis. Therefore, the
data set does not include Belgium, Lithuania and Sweden. More information
about the EES2004 project is available at http://www.ees-homepage.net/.
3 The appendix is available on the EUP website. See http://www.
uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm.
4 For a more thorough discussion and illustration of various combinations of
European Union Politics 7(4)4 4 6
the intercept and the slope coefficient and their implications for political
representation, see Kitschelt et al. (1999: 80–7).
5 We defined parties that had average values below 4 on the 10-point left/right
scale as left-wing parties. Parties with values over 7 were classified as right-
wing parties.
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